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Abstract The establishment and maintenance of order—that is, of settled rules and
arrangements that regulate actors’ behavior—is central to politics at all levels,
including the international level. Political order, after all, is a requisite for modern
human existence. Given the priority of the problem of order, the most important
questions that can be addressed in an introductory International Relations (IR) course
are those that concern the sources, nature, and historical evolution of international
order. But a survey of conventional introductory IR textbooks reveals that these
questions are typically dealt with glancingly or ignored altogether. Thus a strong case
can be made that conventional IR textbooks overlook a vital aspect of the subject they
are intended to cover. This failure appears to arise from an effort by IR textbook
authors to explain international politics in terms of timeless dynamics that exist apart
from history. But excluding history as a source of explanation comes at a high cost. In
effect, it prevents textbooks from adequately weighing the significance of the
historically specific bargains that have provided the foundation for international order
in modern times.

During the past two decades, the problem of international order has emerged as a
topic of consuming interest for International Relations (IR) scholars and commentators.
Much of the attention being devoted to the subject appears to arise from a sense that the
existing international order—typically referred to as the Liberal International Order
(LIO)—currently faces its most severe challenges since it came into existence in the late
1940s. These challenges include the rise of illiberal populist movements around the
world (including in the United States), the growing international reach of illiberal powers
such as China and Russia, and the emergence of potent new sources of global disorder
including climate change and the Covid-19 pandemic (Lake, Martin, and Risse 2021,
225). Many scholars credit the LIO with making possible the extended peace among
Western states and the extraordinary increase in Western living standards since 1945.
Thus the rise of fundamental challenges to the LIO has prompted an intensified effort to
clarify the order’s nature and workings, as well as the prospects for keeping it in place.
Numerous scholarly and foreign affairs journals including International Organization,
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International Affairs, International Spectator, Foreign Affairs, Security Studies, Ethics
and International Affairs, and the Cambridge Review of International Affairs have
published special issues devoted to the future of the LIO.1 Prominent think tanks
including the Brookings Institution, the RAND Corporation, and the German Institute for
International and Security Affairs have initiated special projects examining the problem
of international order from a policy perspective.2 The number of academic books and
articles focused specifically on questions of international order has grown explosively.
Whereas a Google Scholar search for the phrase “liberal international order” returns 224
results for the five-year period from 1997 to 2001, it returns 7,120 results for the fiveyear period from 2017 to 2021.3
Given the amount of scholarly work now being focused on international order,
one might assume that conventional introductory IR textbooks would provide students
with a strong grounding in the topic—addressing questions such as: What is an
international order? How is an international order created and maintained? What causes
international orders to break down? What are the defining features of the present-day
order? How does the present-day order differ from past orders? But this is not the case.
Conventional IR textbooks typically ignore these questions, or at best touch on them
lightly.
In this article, I examine how conventional IR textbooks deal with the problem of
international order. I argue that conventional textbooks employ a conception of
international politics that deflects attention away from the presence and significance of
order, leading to inadequate treatment of the topic. My analysis of what conventional
textbooks say (or fail to say) about international order is based on an examination of
twelve currently available introductory IR textbooks. The books are listed in the
Appendix. All of them are “comprehensive” works designed to provide a wide-ranging
overview of the field. All are published by leading textbook publishers.
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See International Organization 75:2 (2021), International Affairs 94:1 (2018) and 97:5 (2021),
International Spectator 53:1 (2018), Foreign Affairs 96:1 (2017) and 98:1 (2019), Security
Studies 28:3 (2019), Ethics and International Affairs 32:1 (2018), and Cambridge Review of
International Affairs 33:1 (2020).
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The Brookings Institute’s Project on International Order and Strategy (originally called the
Project on Managing Global Order) was initiated in 2007. The RAND Corporation’s Project on
Building a Sustainable International Order ran from 2016 to 2018. The German Institute for
International and Security Affairs’ Project on the Future of International Order ran from 2015 to
2018.
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The article proceeds in three parts. The first part examines the concept of
international order and discusses the role of foundational bargains among states in
providing the basis for order. The second part surveys how the question of international
order is addressed in conventional IR textbooks. The third part discusses how weak
coverage of international order in IR textbooks gives rise to a deficient and misleading
portrayal of international political dynamics.
The Concept of International Order
Perhaps the first question that needs to be addressed is why, until recently, the
study of international order has been relatively neglected by IR scholars. If international
order is such an important topic, why has it not received more sustained attention? The
answer to this question appears to lie in the way that IR as an academic discipline—
particularly in the United States—redefined itself following the publication of Kenneth
Waltz’s Theory of International Politics (1979). In contrast to earlier realist scholars,
Waltz identified anarchy as the decisive attribute of the international system. According
to Waltz, the fact of anarchy imposes a structural imperative of self-help on the political
units (sovereign states) that comprise the system. As a result of this imperative, states
function as essentially undifferentiated units, locked in an unchanging struggle for
survival in a durably anarchic environment.
As Jack Donnelly (2015) shows, Waltz’s emphasis on the structural significance
of anarchy has had a deep and lasting impact on American IR scholarship. References to
anarchy, which were rare in IR textbooks prior to Waltz, became pervasive in the 1980s
and have remained so ever since. In effect, key elements of Waltz’s conception of
international politics came to dominate the field. Although Waltz’s theory has been
subjected to sustained and penetrating criticism, scholars in the realist, liberal, and
constructivist camps have all largely accepted anarchy as the primary ordering principle
of international systems (Donnelly 2015, 401–2; Donnelly 2012, 617; Lake 2007, 47;
Hurd 2008, 308). Most liberal and constructivist scholars differ from Waltz mainly in
arguing that the damaging effects of anarchy can be mitigated, rather than in disputing
the centrality of anarchy in structuring the international realm.
As Donnelly also shows, Waltz implicitly portrayed anarchy not merely as the
absence of a centralized world government but as the absence of effective international
governance. Crucially, these are two different meanings of the term, with fundamentally
different implications. It is one thing to define anarchy as the absence of government—
that is, the absence of a centralized governing apparatus capable of legislating for the
world and effectively enforcing its acts. This meaning of anarchy is largely
uncontroversial. It is quite another thing to define anarchy as the absence of governance
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—that is, the absence of effective rules and authority. Under this definition, one assumes
that effective governance cannot exist in an anarchic setting. This is a momentous
assumption—one that does not flow logically from the simple absence of centralized
government (Donnelly 2015, 409–12; Milner 1991; Hurd 1999) and that largely severs
the study of international politics from history.
In adopting Waltz’s assumption that anarchic systems intrinsically lack effective
rules and authority, American IR has also largely adopted the implications that follow
from this assumption. One implication is that the international system is a self-help realm
that allows for little functional differentiation among states. Each state is compelled to
imitate the successful practices of other states, or it endangers its survival (Waltz 1979,
104–5, 128). A second implication is that the character of international politics has not
changed fundamentally across the millennia (Waltz 1979, 65–70). In conceptualizing
anarchy as the absence of rules and authority, Waltz’s anarchy assumption leads to the
deduction that international politics cannot change fundamentally unless anarchy is
replaced by a world government. However, both of these assumed implications of
anarchy are logically problematic (Donnelly 2012; 2015). An anarchic system is not
necessarily a self-help system, nor does it preclude fundamental alterations over time in
the character of relations among states.
The study of international order, rather than assuming away the possibility of
effective international governance, instead seeks to discern the underlying political
bargains that regulate relations among states. It asks how political order among states is
created, how it is maintained, and why it breaks down. It investigates the varieties of
order that have existed in different international settings. It asks how and why
international order has changed over time. These questions rightfully belong at the center
of the study of international politics, inasmuch as questions about the nature and
functioning of political order are central to understanding any political system, including
the international system.
What exactly is international order? Following G. John Ikenberry (2014, 85), we
may define it as “the settled arrangements that define and guide relations between states.”
An international order prohibits certain behaviors by states and legitimizes others. It
specifies the obligations and commitments of member states toward other states. It is
embodied in a particular set of foundational rules and agreements. However,
international orders tend to be more amorphous and difficult to pin down than is perhaps
implied by this definition. For one thing, core elements of an international order may
exist as informal understandings rather than formal commitments. As a result, it may be
difficult for observers to characterize these commitments precisely. In addition, not all
states may be equally integrated into a given international order. Depending on the nature
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of the order, certain states may be participants in certain elements of the order but not
others. Also, an international order may be regional rather than global in scope, meaning
that some states lie outside it altogether. In addition, some elements of an order may
contradict (or at least be in tension with) other elements. And because international
orders are always contested, with member states each seeking to modify the order to
more closely match their preferences, no international order exists in a completely stable
and unchanging condition.
It is essential to note that the concept of international order employed in this
article refers to purposive order that has been created by states intentionally. This
definition is at odds with the one adopted by some scholars (e.g., Schweller 2001), who
conceive of international order in terms of regularities or patterns that emerge as a
spontaneous, unintended result of the policy choices of states interacting under anarchy.
To a large extent, these two definitions of order are mutually exclusive. Those who view
order as an unintended, emergent property of an anarchic international system follow
Waltz in arguing (fallaciously) that anarchy imposes a self-help imperative on states, and
that this imperative will in turn tend to override whatever purposive international orders
states seek to construct. Thus the Waltzian conception of international order expressly
downplays the significance of efforts by states to construct purposive international
orders. This helps explain why the study of purposive international order has until
recently been so neglected by the discipline (Rengger 2000, 48–49).
The concept of order employed in this article also differs from approaches that
equate international order with the existence of international laws, norms, institutions,
and regimes. These are indeed features of order, but the argument here is that the
effectiveness of these features depends on an underlying political accommodation or
“foundational bargain” among states. In the absence of such a bargain, international
laws, norms, and institutions are likely to be rendered irrelevant. As shown by Russia’s
2014 and 2022 invasions of Ukraine, a major power that rejects existing foundational
bargains may behave in ways that show little regard for international laws and norms. In
other words, international order as defined here refers to order that arises from a specific
foundational bargain or group of bargains. The concept of foundational bargains is
developed in greater detail below.
Why do states seek to establish international order? Perhaps most fundamentally,
they do so because the existence of order reduces the potential threats that they face from
other states (Bull 1977; Schroeder 2010, 81–83). To the extent that other states agree to
abide by specified constraints on their behavior, a state confronts a more predictable and
less dangerous external environment than would otherwise be the case. For the largest
and most capable states, the appeal of international order is especially compelling. The
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most powerful states can shape international order to particularly favor their own
interests and preferences. And although a powerful state may be able to protect its
security to some extent even in the absence of international order—for example, by
threatening war against other states that attack its interests—it can normally advance its
interests far more effectively, and at much lower cost, by working with other states to
establish a mutually accepted international order (Lake 2009).
Historically, the scope and stability of international order have rested above all on
the highly unequal distribution of capabilities among states. At any given time in modern
history, there have been only a few states—sometimes no more than one or two—that
possess strong capabilities for exerting influence far beyond their own borders. A few
other states possess significant capabilities, and many states possess limited or minimal
capabilities. This has been the case for more than two hundred years and appears certain
to remain the case for the foreseeable future. The unequal distribution of capabilities
among states greatly facilitates the creation and maintenance of an international order.
The few states with relatively large capabilities (which may be economic, diplomatic,
technological, and cultural as well as military) are well-placed to shape the international
environment by making foundational bargains with other states. Such bargains, which
serve the interests of both sides, establish the basic framework for international order.
High-capability states take the lead in establishing foundational bargains because they are
able to offer other states large incentives for cooperation and to impose large penalties
for a failure to cooperate. By their nature, foundational bargains tend to be self-enforcing
in a broad sense, although the participating states normally engage in ongoing efforts to
adjust the terms of the bargains to make them more favorable to themselves (Lake 2009,
30–34).
Foundational bargains impose obligations and constraints on the participating
states. In part, these obligations and constraints may take the form of rules—guidelines
for conduct that are binding on all participants. But foundational bargains also usually
include quid pro quos. Some quid pro quos may be symmetrical, in that the concessions
offered by the participants are similar in nature. An agreement between two powerful
states in which each acknowledges the other’s leading status or sphere of influence
would be an arrangement of this type. Other quid pro quos may be asymmetrical, in that
the concessions offered by the participants are dissimilar in nature and create different
roles for the participants. An example of an asymmetrical arrangement would be a
security guarantee provided by state A to state B in exchange for B’s agreement to allow
A to maintain military bases on its territory. Historically, quid pro quos of various kinds
have been central to the creation of international orders.
Logically, it makes sense that international order would rest on foundational
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bargains. Bargaining is the essence of politics, and foundational bargains are present
within states as well as between them. For example, the legitimacy of a modern national
government rests ultimately on its ability to provide security and prosperity to the people
it rules. In other words, there is a bargain between government and people: the people
accept the government’s authority in exchange for effective government measures to
ensure their security and prosperity. At the international level, foundational bargains
involve an exchange in which states accept constraints or obligations in return for the
acceptance of constraints or obligations by other states. By definition, a bargain must
offer something of value to those participating in it. If it does not, there is no basis for
agreement. The only reason for a state to accept the constraints and obligations created
by a foundational bargain is that doing so leaves it better off than if the bargain did not
exist. If a state will not benefit from accepting a bargain, it will have no incentive to do
so. This does not mean that all sides will benefit equally from a foundational bargain. For
a bargain to be possible, it is simply necessary that each of the participating states believe
that it is better off accepting the bargain than rejecting it.
History provides numerous examples of international orders rooted in
foundational bargains. Prominent instances include:
• The traditional East Asian tributary system. From the fourteenth century to the
nineteenth century, relations between China and the smaller states surrounding
it—Korea, Vietnam, and at times others—were stabilized by an international order
in the form of a tributary system (Kang 2005, 2010a, 2010b). The system was
based on a bargain in which the smaller states formally accepted tributary status
and emulated many aspects of Chinese culture and society, thereby affirming
China’s self-image as the center of civilization. In return, the Chinese emperor
recognized the rulers of the smaller states as legitimate and normally refrained
from interfering in the smaller states’ domestic politics or foreign relations. Under
the tributary system, the smaller states faced little danger that China would seek to
conquer or seize territory from them. In addition, the bargain provided the
political underpinnings for an extensive regional trade system centered on China.
• The Concert of Europe. Following the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, the
European great powers established a set of largely informal arrangements to
regulate relations among themselves and affirm their collective authority over
European affairs (Schroeder 1972, 405; Elrod 1976). Under these arrangements,
the powers strongly restricted competition among themselves for territory in
Europe. They avoided interfering in each other’s spheres of influence, and they
managed questions affecting the European balance of power through consultation
and consensus among themselves. The Concert system thus protected the status of
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each of the powers. Underlying the Concert system was the negotiated territorial
settlement achieved at the Congress of Vienna. This settlement secured important
territorial and strategic gains for the four victorious great powers—Britain,
Russia, Prussia, and Austria—thereby creating strong incentives for them to
uphold it (Slantchev 2005).
• The post-1945 order. The international order that emerged in the aftermath of
World War Two was complex, and is perhaps best understood as involving three
distinct foundational bargains. The first of these, signified by the formation of the
United Nations, represented a compromise between US efforts to secure global
political-military supremacy for the United States (Wertheim 2019) and the desire
of the world’s less powerful states to shield themselves from external domination
(Tourinho 2021). Under the terms of what could be called the “UN bargain,” the
United States endorsed a UN Charter that enshrined principles of sovereign
equality, respect for states’ political independence and territorial integrity, and
peaceful resolution of disputes. In exchange, the less powerful states accepted
Charter provisions that—via the special powers granted to the permanent
members of the Security Council—effectively granted the United States farreaching authority in identifying threats to global security and leading the global
response to those threats (Simpson 2004, 192–93). The second foundational
bargain of the post-1945 era, which could be called the “liberal bargain,”
established the initial version of the present-day LIO. During its first decades, the
LIO was predominantly a Western rather than a global order, based on a bargain
between the United States and its Western allies. For its part, the United States
provided its allies with economic and security guarantees as well as support for
liberal domestic institutions. In return, the allies placed themselves under US
leadership (Ikenberry 2011, 207–16). The third foundational bargain was between
the United States and the Soviet Union, and could be called the “Cold War
bargain.” Of the three post-1945 bargains, this was the most tenuous and the least
well defined. It amounted to a tacit agreement between the two superpowers to
defer to each other’s vital interests in Europe and East Asia and to respect each
other’s superpower status on security matters such as arms control.
Foundational bargains may range from the relatively minimal, involving few
constraints and obligations by the participating states, to extensive bargains involving
far-reaching commitments. At the minimal end of the spectrum, it is possible to
imagine—hypothetically, at least—a bargain that amounts to little more than a promise
among states to leave each other alone. But such a bargain would hardly offer security in
the contemporary world, where states’ vital interests are continually impacted by
developments that take place outside their borders. The bargain struck in the 1920s
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between the United States, on one side, and Germany and Japan on the other, stands as a
cautionary tale in this regard. As by far the world’s largest economic and financial
power, the United States was in a strong position to bargain with Germany and Japan—
two rising and potentially revisionist powers—on the terms of an international order that
would dissuade them from embarking on large-scale territorial conquest. But the
Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover administrations, in line with their ideology of limited
government, offered a bargain that involved few US commitments beyond adherence to
the 1922 naval disarmament accords, tacit acceptance of Japan’s sphere of influence in
Manchuria, and an attitude of general goodwill toward Germany and Japan provided that
they did not engage in military aggression. In offering minimal concrete incentives to
Germany and Japan to refrain from territorial expansion, the United States passed up an
opportunity to establish a more robust international order in the aftermath of World War
One.
Foundational bargains, and the international orders that arise from them, lie at the
center of international affairs. Because they are designed to satisfy states’ vital interests,
foundational bargains are a major factor in determining whether states remain at peace
with each other. Historically, foundational bargains have also typically established the
parameters for international commerce (for example, by determining to what extent trade
will take place according to liberal principles), established the basic rules of permissible
and prohibited international behavior, created authority relations for the enforcement of
agreed rules and constraints, and established mechanisms for the management of
collective action problems.
Conceiving international politics in terms of foundational bargains challenges the
Waltzian perspective in three fundamental ways. First, it means that the logic of self-help
applies only situationally, rather than as a general characteristic of international politics.
To the extent that states are able to achieve security through foundational bargains, selfhelp becomes less significant as a determinant of state actions. Second, it means that
substantial role differentiation among states may develop. In defining authority relations
among states and establishing certain states as leaders and others as followers,
foundational bargains may enable the emergence of a considerable degree of functional
specialization and division of labor among states (Lake 2009). For example, under the
post-1945 liberal bargain the United States assumed primary responsibility for the
military defense of the West, whereas its former adversaries Germany and Japan evolved
into what Hanns Maull (1990/91) has called “civilian powers.” Third, the far-reaching
impact of foundational bargains means that the essential character of international
politics may vary considerably from one historical setting to another. There is less
“similarity and repetition of international outcomes” across historical eras than Waltz
asserts (1979, 67).
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IR Knowledge as Presented in Textbooks
Given the centrality of international order to the functioning of international
politics, it is striking that conventional IR textbooks largely disregard the subject. For
example, of the twelve textbooks examined for this study, only one (MCM) includes a
glossary entry for “order” or “international order.” Although the phrase “international
order” appears here and there in a majority of the textbooks, in most cases it is employed
casually and without explicit definition. All of the textbooks devote substantial space to
discussing institutional manifestations of international order such as international
organizations and international law. But they do not link these institutions to the
underlying foundational bargains that enable the institutions to function effectively. In
other words, they overlook the political process that gives rise to international order in
the first place. None of the textbooks discusses foundational bargains as a primary source
of orderly relations among states.
If foundational bargains and the international orders associated with them are
central to international politics, how can we account for the fact that conventional IR
textbooks mostly ignore them? The answer appears to be that IR textbook writers (or at
least, those writing for the US market) have adopted core elements of Waltz’s conception
of international politics. The fact of international anarchy is assumed to impose a selfhelp imperative, preventing meaningful role differentiation among states. The logic of
international politics is treated as transhistorical rather than as varying on the basis of
particular foundational bargains. In other words, conventional textbooks adopt an
approach to IR that largely sidelines questions about the nature and operation of
purposive international order.
An examination of how conventional textbooks present IR theory provides insight
into why they have so little to say about international order. All of the textbooks
examined for this study devote one or more full chapters to an explicit discussion of
theory. This discussion is located near the beginning of the book and comprises, on
average, about ten percent of the book’s total pages. All but one of the books organize
their discussion of theory around what are said to be the chief theoretical traditions in IR,
which are identified in most of the books as realism, liberalism, constructivism, Marxism,
and feminism. Realism and liberalism, billed as the most influential traditions, typically
receive the most extensive coverage, followed by constructivism. Marxism and feminism
receive the least detailed treatment.4
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What does the treatment of theory reveal about how the books conceptualize
international order? The following section surveys how the problem of international
order is addressed—or not addressed—in what the books say about realism, liberalism,
and constructivism. These theoretical traditions, because of their positivist epistemology,
might be expected to offer explanatory insight into the origins and nature of international
political order. By contrast, the post-positivist orientation of the Marxist and feminist
traditions means that they are generally not concerned with the problem of international
order as defined here.
Realism. The textbooks are quite similar to each other in their presentation of the
assumptions and logic of the realist tradition. In noting realism’s lengthy historical
pedigree, all but one of the textbooks cite Thucydides as an early realist thinker, and
Machiavelli and Hobbes each receive mention in a majority of the books. Nearly all of
the books distinguish among various strains of realism, noting the differences among
classical realism, neorealism, and neoclassical realism and between offensive and
defensive realism. But despite nodding to the diversity and historical richness of realist
thought, by and large the textbooks offer an essentially Waltzian portrayal of
contemporary realist theory. In this portrayal, anarchy is the defining feature of the
international realm and international politics operates according to the self-help
imperative. We are told that according to realism, “states can only rely on themselves”
(MM, 71); that “the anarchic structure of the international system makes self-help a core
motivation” (SCD, 23); that states “have to rely on self-help to defend themselves” (N,
35); that they are forced to “provide for their own security from external threats” (MCM,
4.25 ); that “[a]bsent any central governing authority in the global system, states are
locked in a self-help relationship with one another” (BHB, 228); that “international
anarchy leads even well-intentioned leaders to practice self-help” (BK, 24); that under
anarchy, states must “rely on self-help” (PG, 46); that “states take measures of their own
accord to protect themselves” (GIM, 79); that “every state must first and foremost look
out for its own survival and security” (FLS, xxxv); that “[r]ealists see a ‘self-help world’”
(D, 61); that “essentially, all realists subscribe to the [imperative of] self-help” (LMB,
81); and that states “react to the situation of global anarchy by relying on their own
resources” (SZ, 81).
Thus, even though neither logic nor history supports the inference that an anarchic
system is necessarily a self-help system, conventional IR textbooks follow Waltz in
5

The textbook by McDonald, Chapman, and Moser (MCM) exists only in a non-paginated digital
format. The book is comprised of 35 modules, with each module divided into numbered sections.
Thus, references to MCM in this article will be given in the form of module and section rather
than page number. For example, “10.3” refers to Module 10, Section 3.
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identifying self-help as a central tenet of contemporary realist theory. In doing so, they
largely foreclose the possibility of using realist theory to explain or even recognize the
existence of international order. (Again, by “international order” I refer to purposive
political order constructed on the basis of foundational bargains.) A realist perspective
that takes the self-help imperative as a given will interpret international politics as a
timeless power struggle defined by strategic competition, security dilemmas, alliance
formation, and armed conflict. And indeed, every one of the textbooks portrays these
phenomena as the key implications of realist theory. By contrast, an “international order”
perspective would highlight foundational bargains among states rather than self-help, and
would be attentive to changes in international political dynamics arising from changes in
foundational bargains.
To the extent that the textbooks draw a connection between realist thought and
purposive international order, they do so mainly in the context of hegemonic stability
theory. Several of the books explicitly link hegemonic stability theory to realist logic.
Most of the books include at least a brief discussion of hegemonic stability theory, noting
its argument that the presence of a hegemonic power can dampen violent conflict among
states, promote trade liberalization, and solve collective action problems. But, consistent
with Waltzian realism, the role of “hegemon” is defined in such a way as to abstract it
from historical context and render it as yet another manifestation of a timeless power
struggle among states. Several of the textbooks, with slight variations in wording, define
a hegemon simply as a dominant power (D, FLS, GIM, MCM, N, SCD, SZ), while others
provide a more detailed definition specifying that a hegemon is both able and willing to
impose rules on the behavior of other states in the system (BK, BHB, LMB, MM, PG).
None of the books addresses the considerable literature that conceives of hegemony as a
negotiated role based on a bargained compact between a high-capability state and other
states (Clark 2011; Cronin 2001; Goh 2013; Goh 2019; Ikenberry 1989; Ikenberry and
Nexon 2019; Lake 2009; Lebow and Valentino 2009). Nor do the books discuss the
variations among hegemonic orders that arise from differences in the ideology and
preferences of one hegemonic power compared with those of another (Kupchan 2014).
In other words, the textbooks use the concept of hegemony in a way that ignores
foundational bargains and preserves the self-help assumption: if international rules exist,
it is because the hegemon imposes them rather than because they have been negotiated.
This approach implies that the substantive content of a hegemonic order is of little
interest and need not be discussed, because it is little more than an expression of the
distribution of power.
Liberalism. The textbooks are less uniform in their portrayal of liberal IR theory
than in their portrayal of realism. As one textbook notes, “[l]iberalism is a much more
diverse body of theories than realism ... and is therefore more difficult to summarize
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coherently” (D, 71). As another says, “liberal theory tends ... to be more fragmented [than
realism] because it directs our attention to many more factors in world politics” (SCD,
64). Even so, some common themes and elements are apparent. According to all of the
books, liberal theory sees greater potential for positive-sum cooperation among states
than realist theory does. In explaining why liberal theory is more “optimistic” than
realism about the prospects for cooperation, the books generally point to some
combination of the following arguments: 1) Domestic interest groups that stand to gain
from international cooperation—for example, export-oriented producers that wish to gain
access to foreign markets—may pressure their government to reach cooperative deals
with other states; 2) International institutions facilitate cooperation among states by
reducing the transaction costs involved in reaching agreements and by providing
verification and enforcement mechanisms to support the agreements; 3) Reciprocity
creates powerful ongoing incentives for cooperation; 4) Complex interdependence
enables states to deemphasize the relative-gains concerns that might otherwise stand in
the way of cooperative action.
A few of the textbooks distinguish between what might be called “inside-out” and
“outside-in” versions of liberal theory. The “outside-in” version, commonly known as
neoliberal institutionalism, largely accepts the core assumptions of Waltzian neorealism,
including the notion that states are driven by a self-help imperative arising from systemic
anarchy. This version of liberal theory differs from neorealism mainly in emphasizing the
importance of international institutions in promoting reciprocity and helping states
overcome mistrust that would otherwise impede mutually beneficial cooperation.
Because of its Waltzian starting-point, the logic of neoliberal institutionalism does not
point in the direction of foundational bargains or role differentiation among states. By
contrast, the “inside-out” version of liberal theory views domestic processes, rather than
a systemically imposed self-help imperative, as the primary source of states’ foreign
policy choices. This version of liberal theory, because it is not shackled by the limiting
assumptions of Waltzian neorealism, would seem at least in principle to be compatible
with the study of purposive international order. But of the few textbooks that explicitly
discuss the “inside-out” version of liberal theory (GIM 92–94; MCM, 4.3–4.4; MM
79–82), none spells out a connection between the domestic formulation of policy choices
and the establishment of foundational bargains among states.
Constructivism. The textbooks are quite uniform in their characterization of
constructivist theory. Constructivism, we are told, views ideational processes as more
fundamental than material ones. States’ interests and goals take shape through social
interaction, rather than being determined by material factors. Constructivists explore the
social sources of identities rather than taking identities as given. They emphasize the
importance of socially constructed norms in regulating relations among states.
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In some ways, the constructivist tradition might seem to offer a ready-made
opportunity for IR textbooks to address the question of purposive international order.
Constructivism, like the study of international order, emphasizes agency and contingency
in international politics. More than half of the textbooks quote Alexander Wendt’s
famous dictum that “anarchy is what states make of it.” On this point, the constructivist
tradition would appear to be in close alignment with an international order perspective.
But as portrayed in the textbooks, constructivism appears to have little to say about the
foundational bargains at the heart of international order. According to the textbooks,
constructivism views change in international politics as arising through processes of
socialization, learning, and norm diffusion that alter the identities and preferences of
states. This portrayal, although it envisages the possibility of fundamental change in
international politics, is largely silent on the practical question of how changes in states’
identities and preferences might then lead to the remaking of the foundational bargains
that structure international order. In focusing on how social processes can bring about
international change, constructivism largely ignores bargaining as a source of change and
implicitly treats states as undifferentiated units.
I turn next to a discussion of what conventional IR textbooks say about
international history. From an international order perspective, international history merits
a central place in the study of IR, including at the introductory level. History illuminates
the problem of order by enabling us to compare the international orders of different eras
and different historical contexts (e.g., Kocs 2019). Such comparisons “denaturalize” the
present-day order by calling attention to the specific circumstances that gave rise to it and
the ways in which its substantive content differs from that of previous international
orders. Comparing the present-day order to past orders also makes it possible to identify
long-term directional trends in the character of international governance. In addition,
examining the rise and fall of past orders helps us to understand how international orders
are created, how they are sustained, and why they break down. Thus, comparative
historical analysis is a primary method for studying international order.
How is the problem of international order addressed in the parts of conventional
IR textbooks that deal with international history? As with their treatment of IR theory,
conventional textbooks treat international history in a way that largely overlooks
questions involving purposive international order. Nearly all of the books include at least
one chapter devoted to international history, but in general they do not use the chapter to
illuminate differences between the present-day international order and past orders or to
identify long-term changes in the character of international order. Instead, they use the
chapter for other purposes: to provide basic background information, to introduce
various IR concepts, to suggest historical lessons and analogies for present-day
consideration, to highlight recurring patterns, and to provide data for evaluating
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theoretical propositions. None of the textbooks draws explicit comparisons between
international orders in different historical periods.
On the whole, the historical coverage in the textbooks tends to portray the
character of international politics as remaining largely unchanged over the past several
centuries. Most of the textbooks offer a version of what de Carvalho, Leira, and Hobson
(2011) have called the “myth of 1648”—the idea that the 1648 Peace of Westphalia
established the modern state system comprised of sovereign states interacting under
anarchy. We are told, for example, that the Westphalian settlement “is widely recognized
by scholars as the birth of the modern nation-state system” (BHB, 11); that it “ushered in
the contemporary international system by establishing the principle of sovereignty”
(LMB, 36); that it “established ... the practice of sovereignty” (N, 14); that it “began the
modern state system” (SCD, 24); that it “formally recognized” the “revolutionary
principle of sovereignty” (SZ, 40); that it “embraced the notion of sovereignty” (MM,
21); that it “established the basic rules that have defined the international system ever
since—the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states as equal and independent
members of an international system” (PG, 55).
Setting aside the factually questionable nature of these statements (Croxton 1999;
Osiander 2001), the myth of 1648 is problematic because it obscures processes of change
in international politics. In the words of de Carvalho, Leira, and Hobson, the myth
“effects an ahistorical temporalist sleight of hand, wherein 1648 marks the boundary of
an endless and synchronic present” (2011, 756). The myth thereby deflects attention
away from the problem of international order. After all, why bother to compare the
structure of international order in different historical periods if the essential nature of
international politics is unchanging? The presence of the Westphalian myth helps explain
why the historical chapter in several of the textbooks comes across as little more than a
recital of endlessly recurring strategic rivalries, arms races, and wars. In their coverage of
international history, as in their coverage of IR theory, conventional IR textbooks tend to
remain largely within the Waltzian framework. This framework shapes both the selection
and the interpretation of the historical material. For example, although nearly all of the
textbooks devote multiple pages to discussing the two World Wars, they typically say
little if anything about the new foundational bargains that arose after those wars. From an
international order perspective, the foundational bargains that emerge in the wake of
systemic conflicts such as the World Wars are of crucial significance, because they
reshape the fundamental character of international order (Ikenberry 2001; Kocs 2019;
Lascurettes 2020). But of the textbooks examined for this study, only MCM (16.4)
explicitly addresses this point.
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Implications
In ignoring the existence of foundational bargains among states, conventional IR
textbooks offer a constricted and misleading portrayal of how international politics
works in the modern world. The failure to consider foundational bargains is especially
significant in two respects. First, it gives rise to a faulty analysis of the causes of war and
peace among states. A core function of foundational bargains is to reduce (or in some
cases, foreclose) the possibility of war between the states participating in the bargain. If
foundational bargains are often the single most important factor in determining the
likelihood of war, then discussions that fail to take account of such bargains are
inherently flawed. Second, the failure to consider foundational bargains gives rise to
problematic or superficial analyses of international change. A core function of
foundational bargains is to define the stakes of interaction between participating
countries. Thus, analyses that fail to take account of foundational bargains are likely to
do a poor job of specifying what is at stake in processes of international political change.
One of the main reasons why states enter into foundational bargains is to reduce
the likelihood of being drawn into wars they would prefer to avoid. For example, a
powerful state may offer a security guarantee to a less powerful state as a way of
pacifying the less powerful state and limiting its strategic options (Schroeder 2004;
Pressman 2008). This was a central purpose of the security guarantees provided by the
United States during the Cold War to West Germany and Japan (Joffe 1984; Cha 2016).
More broadly, a key goal of the dozens of alliance and client state relationships
established by the United States with less powerful states since 1945 has been to
suppress security competition among those states and reduce the possibility that they
might initiate wars with states outside the US alliance/client network (Rosato 2003, 600).
By the same token, a primary purpose of foundational bargains between major-power
rivals is to enable the participants to secure their core interests by means short of war
with each other.
Thus, the proper starting point for explaining patterns of international peace and
conflict in the contemporary world is an analysis of foundational bargains. What bargains
exist? How, and to what extent, do they inhibit armed conflict among the participating
states? For example, in accounting for the stability of peaceful relations among liberal
democracies since 1945, the hegemonic bargain between the United States and its
Western allies looms large. Because hegemonic bargains are a component of
international system structure, they take analytical priority over causal explanations that
assume states to be fully independent units operating in a self-help environment
(McDonald 2015).
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All of the textbooks examined for this study devote substantial space—at least two
full chapters, in the majority of cases—to the topic of armed conflict and military
security. In most of the books, this material includes discussion of both the causes of
interstate war and the strategies that states may pursue in their quest for security. A few
of the books also include an explicit discussion of the causes of peace. But conspicuously
missing from these discussions is an exploration of how patterns of war and peace are
affected by the existence of foundational bargains.
In explaining why interstate wars occur, many of the textbooks (BK, 196–210;
BHB, 198–202; D, 210–19; GIM, 210–24; PG, 141-43; SCD, 131–37) approach the
topic using a “levels of analysis” framework, focusing sequentially on causes at the
individual level, the state level, and the systemic level. In these books, the systemic
causes of war are interpreted primarily through a Waltzian lens. Anarchy is identified as
the decisive permissive cause of interstate war, while power transitions are highlighted as
crucial proximate causes of war. (In a nod to neoliberal institutionalism, a few of the
books mention economic interdependence as a systemic variable that may also affect
patterns of war and peace.) In adopting Waltz’s characterization of system structure as
being defined by anarchy and the international distribution of power, these books
overlook the structural impact of foundational bargains, which shape patterns of
international war and peace by reducing the possibility of a resort to military force among
the states participating in the bargains.
Two of the textbooks (MCM, Modules 8–10, and FLS, 100–35) explain the
occurrence of armed conflict mainly in terms of the rational-choice “bargaining model”
of war (Fearon 1995). In this model, the decision for war typically results from
factors—private information, indivisible goods, commitment problems—that prevent
states from reaching a bargain that preserves peace, even though states would normally
prefer such a bargain to the costs and risks of a war. Implicitly, the bargaining model
begins from the Waltzian self-help assumption. As such, it too fails to account for the
impact of foundational bargains. Foundational bargains affect overall patterns of
international war and peace precisely because they structure relationships among
participating states on a basis other than self-help. In other words, the existence of a
foundational bargain among a particular pair or group of states would typically prevent
the rational-choice bargaining model of war from coming into play in the first place,
because the foundational bargain removes war as a normal policy option in relations
among those states.
Most of the textbooks situate their examination of the causes of war within a
broader discussion of international security. Depending on the textbook, this discussion
may also include an overview of strategies used by states to bolster their security or an
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analysis of the causes of international peace. Here as well, the books typically overlook
the existence and impact of foundational bargains. For example, in examining the routes
available to states for strengthening their security and preventing war, the books discuss
a variety of competitive and cooperative strategies. The competitive strategies, often
explicitly labeled as “realist,” include arms buildups, balancing, deterrence, the
acquisition of allies, and selective uses of force. The cooperative strategies, often
explicitly labeled as “liberal,” include disarmament, arms control, collective security,
democracy promotion, economic interdependence, and reliance on international law.
Some of the books also discuss “constructivist” security strategies including the
strengthening of global norms of peaceful interaction and the reshaping of relational
friend/foe identities.
Generally absent from these analyses is discussion of how states use foundational
bargains to strengthen their security. For example, most of the textbooks make no
mention of bargains in which a powerful state provides a security guarantee to a less
powerful state in exchange for the ability to restrain the less powerful state from
engaging in actions damaging to the powerful state’s interests. None of the books
includes a glossary entry or index entry for “security guarantee.” In the twelve books
collectively, only a few isolated mentions of security guarantees can be found. These
include a brief discussion in MCM (9.4 and 11.3) of the 1955 bargain in which West
Germany gained membership in NATO (together with the associated security guarantee)
in exchange for accepting limits on its rearmament and its ability to pursue territorial
revisions, and some discussion in SZ (106, 168, 170) of security guarantees as a factor in
preserving international stability. And although all the textbooks identify nuclear
proliferation as an international security concern, only two (FLS, 625–26; MCM, 14.5)
mention that the United States has used security guarantees as a key instrument for
dissuading friendly states from developing nuclear weapons (Gavin 2015).
A majority of the textbooks include some discussion of alliance formation as a
security strategy. All of these discussions highlight capability aggregation, rather than the
consolidation of international order, as the primary purpose for forming an alliance. Thus
we are told that alliances “provide opportunities for enhancing a state’s power position in
the system” (BHB, 229); that they “generally have the purpose of augmenting their
members’ power by pooling capabilities” (PG, 57); that they “increase the military power
of all their members by aggregating their military capabilities” (MCM, 11.3); that they
enable states to “counter threats and increase strength” (SCD, 157) and that they
“increase the likelihood that two states will cooperate militarily in the event of war”
(FLS, 206). But when an alliance takes the form of a security guarantee by a powerful
state to a less powerful state (as is typically the case with US alliances since 1945), much
of its purpose involves solidifying international order by limiting the ability of the junior
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alliance partner to initiate wars independently of the senior partner. Because the
textbooks lack a conceptual framework for analyzing purposive international order, they
typically overlook the order-maintenance function of alliances.
By the same token, there is virtually no mention in the textbooks of client state
relationships, even though entering into client relationships is a prominent method used
by both weak states (the clients) and powerful states (the patrons) to improve their
security position (Carney 1989; Sylvan and Majeski 2009). None of the textbooks
includes a glossary entry or index entry for “client state.” Client relationships, like
security guarantees, are among the key instruments used by powerful states to exercise
control beyond their borders and secure a favorable external environment. In that sense,
security guarantees and client relationships function as modern-day analogs to the
colonial possessions and protectorates of earlier historical eras.
In summary, conventional IR textbooks approach the topic of international
security from a perspective heavily influenced by Waltzian assumptions. In explaining
the causes of interstate war and peace, they typically treat states as fully independent
actors motivated by a self-help imperative, rather than—more realistically—as
constrained actors whose options for choosing war may be largely determined by existing
foundational bargains.
The failure to take foundational bargains into account also contributes to problems
of superficiality in the way conventional IR textbooks address the question of systemic
change in international politics. Nearly all of the textbooks examined for this study
grapple to at least some extent with the question of change. What types of systemic
change are most likely to take place in coming years, given current trends and
developments? How would these changes matter? In addressing this topic, the textbooks
are handicapped by their lack of a conceptual framework for characterizing international
order. In the absence of such a framework, they struggle to identify what is at stake in the
change from one international order to another. To evaluate the significance of systemic
change in international politics, it is necessary to be able to compare the current
international order with a different order that might exist in the future. The starting point
for such a comparison is to identify the substantive elements of the international order
that exists today. But of the twelve textbooks, only two (FLS, 611–13; MCM, 35.5) make
an explicit effort to do so.
The question of systemic change arises especially in regard to China’s emergence
as a power with economic and military capabilities second only to those of the United
States. How might China’s rise affect the rules, practices, and bargains that structure the
existing international order? IR scholars have identified this as one of the most
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consequential questions in international politics today, and have debated it at length (e.g.,
Beeson 2013; Callahan 2008; Chin and Thakur 2010; Ikenberry 2018; Ikenberry and Lim
2017; Johnston 2019; Jones 2018; Mazarr, Heath, and Cevallos 2018; Nathan 2016;
Owen 2021; Rolland 2020; Tang 2018; Tobin 2020; Weiss and Wallace 2021; Wu 2018;
Zhao 2016). Nearly all of the textbooks examined for this study point to the rise of China
as a momentous development, but most of them have little to say about how China’s rise
might affect the character of international order. In effect, the textbooks appear to be
limited by their implicit adoption of Waltz’s conception of international politics as a
realm governed by timeless self-help dynamics. This conception, which emphasizes
continuity and recurrence in the pattern of relations among states, does not readily lend
itself to an analysis of substantive change in those patterns. Thus, the textbooks tend to
interpret the rise of China mainly through the lens of hegemonic stability theory (D, 66,
436), power transition theory (FLS, 636–44; MCM, 20.5; N, 182–84; PG 52, 74; SCD,
113), or a return to bipolarity (GIM, 513–16). A shortcoming of these approaches, of
course, is that they focus mainly on shifts in the international distribution of power rather
than on the question of how the substantive content of an international order led by
China would differ from that of the existing LIO. A few of the books (D, 436; FLS, 641;
MM, 112–13; MCM, 20.1) do raise this question, but none addresses it in detail.
Conclusion
On the whole, the portrait of international politics that emerges from conventional
IR textbooks strongly resembles the one offered by Kenneth Waltz in Theory of
International Politics. In this portrayal, sovereign states function as essentially
undifferentiated units, interacting with each other according to the timeless dynamics of a
self-help imperative. This portrayal of international politics is an abstraction that differs
in crucial ways from the world we actually inhabit—what might be called the “historical”
world. In the historical world, powerful states seek actively to shape the international
environment to manage the threats and uncertainties that emanate from beyond their
borders. In pursuit of this objective, they typically attempt to reach foundational bargains
with other states. Such bargains establish role differentiation among states and reduce the
need for the participating states to pursue self-help strategies in their relations with each
other. Because the substantive content of foundational bargains depends heavily on
historically specific factors, the character of international politics may differ greatly from
one historical setting to another.
None of the textbooks examined for this study discusses the role of foundational
bargains in defining the content and functioning of international order. None examines
the impact of foundational bargains on patterns of international war and peace. None
shows how changes in foundational bargains correspond to changes in the stakes and
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dynamics of relations among states. In these respects, conventional IR textbooks offer a
significantly misleading and incomplete portrayal of how international politics works.
Having said this, it should be apparent from the analysis presented here that some
textbooks address the problem of international order with more depth and sophistication
than others. It is also worth noting that, of the textbooks examined for this study, MCM
stands largely alone in its sustained focus on international order. The authors organize
their book explicitly around the concept of order, and although the book does not refer to
foundational bargains as such, its narrative often implicitly notes the structural impact of
such bargains (e.g., 1.4, 9.4, 11.3, 14.5, 16.4, 20.1). But in important ways, even MCM
seems to remain largely within the Waltzian framework. As noted earlier, the book’s
analysis of the causes of war employs a rational-choice approach that does not take
account of foundational bargains. And its module on “Great Power Politics” (Module
20), which might have explored the bargaining process that establishes certain states as
managers of international order, instead adheres to an essentially Waltzian focus on
polarity and the international distribution of power.
One can imagine reasons why IR textbook authors might be reluctant to address
the problem of international order. There is simplicity and theoretical elegance in
portraying the international realm as being comprised of independent and functionally
undifferentiated states, each motivated by a systemically imposed self-help imperative.
Such a portrayal lends itself to concise explanation and creates the illusion of offering
timeless insights into international political dynamics. Such a portrayal also makes it easy
to draw distinctions among realist, liberal, and constructivist theoretical perspectives. By
contrast, describing the international realm in terms of historically specific foundational
bargains requires a more complicated explanation. Also, a focus on foundational
bargains implicitly favors a holistic or synthetic analysis rather than an emphasis on the
alternative interpretations generated by different theoretical “paradigms.” Thus, fully
engaging with the problem of international order would likely require a substantial
reconceptualization of the conventional IR textbook. But if, as this article has argued,
purposive international order is central to international politics, then its existence and
impact should not be slighted—even in introductory textbooks.
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